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We develop a theoretical model to analyze how the lack of full enrollment affects the quality of public 
education chosen by majority voting. In our model, the households choose whether to enrol their child at 
school or not. Poor households do not send their children to school because there is an opportunity cost 
related to education. We show that if preferences for public education quality are decreasing in income, 
an ends against the middle equilibrium may arise with low levels of expenditures. In this setting, the 
introduction of a conditional cash transfer program may increase the educational budget chosen by 
majority voting. Indeed, by raising school enrollment, it increases the political support for educational 
expenditures. 
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Dans cet article, nous développons un modèle théorique pour analyser comment un taux de participation 
scolaire faible peut affecter la qualité de l’éducation choisie par vote majoritaire. Dans ce modèle, les 
ménages décident d’inscrire ou non leurs enfants à l’école. Les ménages pauvres n’envoient pas leurs 
enfants à l’école à cause du coût d’opportunité lié à l’éducation. Si les préférences pour la qualité de 
l’éducation publique sont décroissantes dans le revenu, l’équilibre est déterminé par une coalition entre 
les ménages pauvres et riches et le niveau de dépenses est faible. Dans ce contexte, l’introduction d’un 
programme de transferts conditionnels peut augmenter le budget de l’éducation choisi par vote 
majoritaire. En augmentant la participation scolaire, ce programme renforce le support politique pour 
les dépenses en éducation publique. 
 
Mots clés: éducation, taux de participation scolaire, transferts conditionnels, économie 
politique. 
 
Classification JEL: H42, I28, O12. 1 Introduction
There is a broad agreement on the need to provide universal primary education
worldwide, as enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals.1 The main reason
put forward is that education is a fundamental component of human capital devel-
opment. Moreover, there is an additional argument for why full enrollment should
be pursued that has been much disregarded in the literature. It is related to the
detrimental impact that the lack of full enrollment may have on the political support
for educational expenditures.
Low enrollment is an important issue, even if clear progress has been made in
this domain in the past years. Between 1999 and 2005, 24 million children were
given access to primary education. Nonetheless, there were still 72 million children
out-of-school in 2005, mainly in developing countries (UNESCO, 2008).2
Several educational policies have contributed to increase school enrollment. The
basic education system has been expanded in some countries. Legal provisions for
compulsory education have been established and tuition fees have been abolished
(UNESCO, 2008). While these measures are certainly important, they do not ensure
that all children will be at school. Indeed, even countries with free-of-charge schools
and compulsory education have been confronted with the lack of full enrollment.
Table 1 presents primary and secondary education ﬁgures for for selected countries.
Table 1: Primary and Secondary Education
Primary Secondary Duration of
Net Enrollment % Public Net Enrollment % Public Duration of compulsory
1991 2004 2004 1991 2004 2004 primary education
Brazil 85 95 90 17 78 88 4 8
Colombia 68 86 83 34 55 78 5 10
Mexico 98 98 92 45 67 85 6 10
Nicaragua 70 87 85 - 41 72 6 6
Turkey 89 90 98 42 66 98 6 9
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: http://stats.uis.unesco.org/.
There are several possible explanations for the fact that some children do not
receive any education even if schools are publicly available. A prominent reason is
that education encompasses a variety of direct and indirect costs. One example is
the opportunity cost of education related to foregone child labor earnings.3
The recognition of such costs has given rise to a number of policies designed to
stimulate the households’ demand for education. During the 1990s, several coun-
1http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
2In 2005, total primary school enrollment was 688 million worldwide (UNESCO, 2008).
3There is an extensive literature on child labor. Ranjan (1999) and Baland and Robinson (2000)
constitute examples of papers highlighting the trade-oﬀ between education and child labor.
1tries have implemented programs aimed at providing families with incentives to
put their children through school, such as conditional cash transfers (CCT). Un-
der these programs, low-income households receive a cash transfer if their children
attend school. Apart from alleviating poverty in the short term, these programs
are intended to have long-lasting beneﬁts by raising the children’s human capital.
The Brazilian Bolsa Familia and the Mexican Oportunidades constitute examples
of CCT programs, among others.4
At ﬁrst sight, the fact that some children are excluded from the school system
seems to beneﬁt those currently at school. Indeed, the educational expenditures have
to be divided among fewer children, resulting in a higher expenditure per student.
While this analysis is correct for a ﬁxed educational budget, it can no longer be
applied once one considers that the total amount of educational expenditures reﬂects
the households’ preferences for education. If this is the case, the fact that some
children are out of school may have a perverse impact on school expenditures, as a
consequence of lack of political support for increased funds for education.
The main purpose of this paper is to show how low enrollment may aﬀect the
level of educational expenditures chosen by the households in a political economy
framework. In this context, we also analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of a con-
ditional cash transfer program on the equilibrium level of educational expenditures.
In our model, all the households have the same preferences regarding education
and private consumption. However, families are heterogeneous with respect to their
income. While education increases their utility, there is an opportunity cost associ-
ated to schooling. The latter may be related to foregone child labor earnings or to
other indirect costs, such as material and transport. This cost leads poor households
to drop their children out of school.
The key element in our argument is that once a household is out of school, it
has no incentives to support educational expenditures. Indeed, its utility level is not
aﬀected by the quality of schools. In our model, we show that when rich households
choose high quality of public education, the preferred level of education is chosen
by the median voter and is therefore only indirectly aﬀected by the fact that poor
children are out of school. However, if rich households prefer low quality of public
4There is a growing literature on conditional cash transfer programs. Cardoso and Souza (2004)
show that Brazil’s Bolsa Familia had a positive impact on school attendance while the eﬀect in terms
of reduced child labor is small. The eﬀects on school attendance were consistent with the micro-
simulations’ prediction in Bourguignon et al. (2003). Using data from the Mexican Oportunidades,
Dubois et al. (2003) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect in school continuation while Gertler (2004) highlights the
improvement in child’s health that can be attributed to the program. de Janvry et al. (2006) discuss
the role of conditional cash transfers as safety nets. For a more complete review of the literature
on conditional cash transfers, see Das et al. (2005).
2education, they may form a coalition with poor households out of school. In this
ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, the level of educational expenditures chosen is
lower than the level preferred by the median voter.
A related approach is taken by Tanaka (2003) in a model where the households
have the choice between education and child labor. Restricting the analysis to the
case in which preferences for public education are increasing in income, Tanaka
(2003) argues that if the medium voter is out of school, educational expenditures
are very low and the level of child labor is huge. This result hangs on public school
enrollment rates lower than 50%, what does not seem to be the rule even for de-
veloping countries (Table 1). Moreover, the assumption that the preferred level of
educational expenditures is increasing in income is restrictive if one considers the
possibility of household production of education (Epple and Romano, 1996). In par-
ticular, the possibility of supplementing public school with private services, such as
tutoring leads to a preferred tax level that is decreasing in income.
Finally, we show that by increasing school enrollment, CCT programs may have
a positive eﬀect on the quality of public education. This is a consequence of aug-
mented political support for educational expenditures caused by the inclusion of
poor households in the school system.
The idea that households not beneﬁting from a publicly provided good may vote
for low expenditures has been already explored in models combining public and pri-
vate provision. In these models, public and (higher quality) private schools coexist,
the latter being chosen by rich households. Stiglitz (1974) was the ﬁrst to investigate
theoretically the consequences of public and private provision of education on the
households’ preferences.5
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) present conditions that ensure the existence of a
majority voting equilibrium in this setting. It amounts to assuming that the pre-
ferred level of educational expenditures is decreasing in income. Epple and Romano
(1996) provide a generalization of this result and shows that if the level of educa-
tional expenditures is increasing in income, an ends against the middle equilibrium
may arise. In this setting, the poor and rich households join forces and vote for low
educational expenditures.6 More recently, de la Croix and Doepke (2009) integrate
fertility decisions in the analysis and show that the crowding out of public education
spending occurs only if the society is dominated by the rich. Indeed, in a democracy
where politicians are responsive to low income families, they argue that the presence
5For a rigorous discussion on the conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium,
see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Gans and Smart (1996).
6Epple and Romano (1996) were also interested in understanding the eﬀect of educational vouch-
ers. This issue has been further exploited in related models by Hoyt and Lee (1998), Chen and
West (2000), and Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003).
3of a large private education sector beneﬁts public schools.7
While we share the methodology of Epple and Romano (1996), we focus on a
totally diﬀerent issue. In our model, education is exclusively provided by the state,
but there is an opportunity cost related to its consumption. This cost prevents poor
households from going to school and therefore explains the existence of an ends
against the middle equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3,
we analyze the voting equilibrium when households choose the level of educational
expenditures and the tax rate. In Section 4 we investigate the impact of the CCT
program on the quality of public education chosen by majority voting. In Section 5
we simulate our model and in Section 6 we conclude.
2 The model
2.1 Households
We assume that the economy is composed of a continuum of households that are
identical with respect to their preferences. These are deﬁned over private consump-
tion, c, and education, which is available at quality e.8 The households’ preferences
are represented by the utility function U assumed to be increasing, strictly quasi-
concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.9 Each household has one adult and
one child. We impose the following additional assumptions:
Assumption 1. Education is a normal good.
Assumption 2. There is a level of public education quality that renders a household
indiﬀerent between no school and public school, i.e.,
∀ c, c′ ≥ 0, with c > c′, ∃e > 0 such that U(c′,e) = U(c,0).
Consequently, ∀e′ > e, U(c′,e′) > U(c′,e) since U is increasing in e. As shown
by Epple and Romano (1994) and reproduced in Appendix A, Assumption 1 implies
that the marginal utility of private consumption decreases as its amount increases
along an indiﬀerence curve, i.e.,
7Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) also highlight a diﬀerent mechanism in the context of higher
education. In their model, individuals vote on a partial educational subsidy that may beneﬁt
only the medium and high income population if its level is not high enough to induce low income
households enrollment.
8For simplicity, we consider that expenditures in education always translate into quality. In
reality, the relation between these them is less than evident, as pointed out by Hanushek (2005).
9Subscripts denote partial derivatives, that is, Ux is the partial derivative of the utility function







Assumption 2 ensures the desirability of education in the sense that every household
is ready to sacriﬁce some consumption in order to obtain it, provided that its quality
is substantial. While this assumption simpliﬁes our presentation, it is not essential
for our results.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to their income y. We suppose that
y ∈ [y,y] and is distributed according to the density function f(y). The correspond-
ing cumulative distribution function is F(y). We normalize the population size to
one. Average (and total) income is denoted by ya and the median income by ym.
All households’ incomes are taxed at the constant rate t.10 The government
uses the tax revenues to ﬁnance the public education system. Public education is
freely available at quality e to all households.11 However, not all households go to
public schools since acquiring education entails an opportunity cost w. The latter
may be related to foregone child labor earnings or to other indirect costs related to
schooling.12 The budget constraint of a household using public education is:
ci = (1 − t)yi − w. (2)
The utility function of a household using public education is:
U(ci,e),
where ci is given by (2). His indirect utility function is then given by:
V e(e,t) = U ((1 − t)yi − w,e). (3)
If a household is out of school, its budget constraint is:
ci = (1 − t)yi, (4)
since it does not have to pay for the opportunity cost of education. The utility
function of a household out of school is:
10At the end of Section 3, we discuss how our results change if we consider instead a lump sum
or consumption tax scheme.
11By considering one homogeneous public education market, we rule out the possibility that the
household’s decision to live in a given community may depend on the quality of public education
in that locality (Tiebout, 1956). However, taking into account this possibility seems natural and
would constitute an interesting extension to this work.
12Undoubtedly, school attendance can be combined with some amount of child work, as showed by
Cardoso and Souza (2004). Therefore, w does not represent full child wages, but only the proportion
of it that is incompatible with schooling. Note also that we have assumed that child labor is not
taxed. This is realistic since children work mainly in the informal sector.
5U(ci,0),
where ci is given by (4). Its indirect utility function is:
V 0(t) = U ((1 − t)yi,0), (5)
and is not aﬀected by e since the household does not participate in the educational
system.
A household i compares (3) to (5) in order to take its enrollment decision. Thus,
its utility function is given by:
Υ(e,t,b) = max{U ((1 − t)yi,0),U ((1 − t)yi − w,e)}. (6)
Using (6), let Φ(¯ e,t,w,yi) be the utility diﬀerential between joining or not the school
system. It is deﬁned by:
Φ(e,t,w,yi) ≡ U ((1 − t)yi,0) − U((1 − t)yi − w,e). (7)
2.2 Government
The technology available in this economy is such that e units of private consumption
can be transformed into one unit of education of quality e, i.e. the price of education
is normalized to 1. We require that the government’s budget balances, so that:
tya = eθ (8)
where θ is the enrollment rate.
2.3 Equilibrium
Assumption 2 ensures that there is always a level of public education quality that
persuades a household to enroll at school. In Lemma 1, we show that poor house-
holds require a higher level of public education quality in order to join the educa-
tional system than rich ones. This is related to the diminishing marginal utility of
consumption and to the fact that poorer households are less willing to pay for the
opportunity cost of education.
Lemma 1. There is a level of education quality, denoted ˜ ei, which renders household
i indiﬀerent between no school and public school. The level ˜ ei is decreasing in yi.
Proof. The level of public education quality, ˜ ei, that renders household i indiﬀerent
between not going to school and going to public school in the presence of a CCT
program is deﬁned by:
6Φ(˜ ei,t,w,yi) ≡ 0, (9)
using (7). When the level of public education is zero, (7) is positive:
Φ(0,t,w,yi) = U ((1 − t)yi,0) − U ((1 − t)yi − w,0) > 0.
Assumption 2 ensures that there is a level of e denoted e′ such that:
Φ(e′,t,w,yi) = U ((1 − t)yi,0) − U
￿
(1 − t)yi − w,e′￿
< 0.
The continuity of Φ(e,t,w,yi) is ensured by the continuity of the utility function.
Moreover, Φ(e,t,w,yi) is monotonic:
dΦ
de
= −Ue ((1 − t)yi − w,e) < 0,
so that it crosses the horizontal axis only once. Hence there is a ˜ ei that satisﬁes (9).
We next show that ˜ ei is decreasing in yi. Applying the implicit function theorem to







(1 − t)[Uc ((1 − t)yi,0) − Uc ((1 − t)yi − w, ˜ e)]
Ue ((1 − t)yi − w, ˜ e)
< 0,
due to (1).
The monotonicity of ˜ ei on yi implies the following result:
Corollary 1. If a household i chooses not to go to school, neither do all households
with income yj < yi. If a household i prefers public education to no school, so do all
households with income yj > yi.
Proof. For a household i that strictly prefers no school to public school, we know
that V e
i < V 0
i , where V e and V 0 are given by (3) and (5). Thus ˜ ei is higher than
the level provided, otherwise household i would go to school. This will also be true
for a household j with income yj < yi, since by Lemma 1 it would require an even
higher level of public education quality in order to join the public school.
Consider a household i that strictly prefers public education to no school, that
is, V e
i > V 0
i . This implies that the level of public education available, e, is higher
or equal than ˜ ei, deﬁned by (9), otherwise the household would be out of school.
By Lemma 1, we know that ˜ e is decreasing in income. Thus the level required by
a household j with income yj > yi is lower than ˜ ei. Consequently, household j also
opts for public education.
7Let yl denote the household that is indiﬀerent between joining or not the edu-
cational system for a quality of public education equal to e. Using (7), yl is deﬁned
by:
Φ(e,t,w,yl) ≡ 0. (10)
Thus, the proportion of households attending the public school is given by:
θ(e,t) = 1 − F(yl). (11)
In order to analyze the behavior of the government budget constraint, suppose an
increase in e. Undoubtedly, such an increase in quality attracts additional pupils to
the school system. However, the raise in quality requires an increase in the tax rate,
reducing the disposable income of all households. Consequently, some low income
households drop out of the educational system, unwilling to pay for the opportunity
cost of education. There is room for a reduction in taxes. Lemma 2 shows that this
last eﬀect is of second order and does not oﬀset the initial increase in the tax rate.
Lemma 2. An increase in the quality of public education always require a raise in
taxes.
Proof. The total impact of the quality of public education, e, on taxes, t, is obtained































where εθ,e = ∂θ
∂e
e
θ and εθ,t = ∂θ
∂t
t
θ are the elasticities of the enrollment rate with





















Ue ((1 − t)yl − w,e)
(1 − t)[Uc ((1 − t)yl,0) − Uc ((1 − t)yl − w,e)]
< 0, (15)
8since the denominator is negative due to (1). We now compute the impact of the














3 Voting on the quality of public education and on the
tax rate
In this section, we analyze the household’s choice of the quality of public education,
e, that corresponds to a tax rate, t. We start by considering that all the individuals
vote. At the end of the section, we discuss how the results would change if there
was some level of vote abstention.
Throughout we assume that more than half of the households attend a public
school implying that the median income voter chooses a positive level of educational
expenditures. This assumption is consistent with most educational systems in de-
veloping countries that have public enrollment rates greater than 50%.13 If this was
not the case, the prediction of our model would be very similar to the one in Tanaka
(2003). Indeed, we should expect very low or even zero educational expenditures,
since a positive tax rate could not be the result of a voting equilibrium if less than
half of the population beneﬁt from it.
Additionally, we assume that at the median income household preferred level of
public education quality, the poorest household chooses not to go to school. These
assumptions ensure that the two groups of households actually exist (i.e. out of
school and public school).
Consider a household currently at a public school. The slope of its indiﬀerence
curves (in absolute terms) in the (e,t) space denoted by η(e,t) is:
η(e,t) =





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
Ue ((1 − t)yi − w,e)
yiUc ((1 − t)yi − w,e)
, (18)
using (3).
13As illustrated in Table 1, Colombia and Nicaragua are the only countries that do not fulﬁll
this requirement for secondary education. This is mainly due to the fact that the total secondary
enrollment rates in these countries are very low.
9The slope η(e,t) is not necessarily monotonic in y, as shown in (18). With the
purpose of determining the voting equilibrium, we impose monotonicity conditions
on the preferences over the expenditure-tax bundle (e,t) for the households attending
public school. We suppose that their preferred level of (e,t) either increases or
decreases with income for those households at school. Clearly, two opposite eﬀects
inﬂuence their preferences. On the one hand, rich households favor a higher quality
of public education because education is a normal good. This is the so-called income
eﬀect. On the other hand, the rich pay a larger fraction of educational expenditures
under proportional income taxation. Since any increase in quality requires a raise
in taxes, richer households support decreases in the quality of education in order to
reduce their tax burden. This corresponds to the substitution eﬀect. If the income
eﬀect is larger (resp. smaller) than the substitution eﬀect, the richer the household
the larger (resp. smaller) its preferred level of the expenditure-tax bundle. We
present the detailed analysis of both eﬀects, based on Kenny (1978), in the Appendix
B. We show that which eﬀect dominates depend on the relative magnitudes of the
income elasticity of education and the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and education. The ﬁrst case we study corresponds to the preferred bundle of
expenditure-tax increasing with income.
Proposition 1. If the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax increases with income
for the households at school, the majority voting equilibrium is the median income
voter’s preferred tax rate.
Proof. Let (tm,em) be the expenditure-tax bundle preferred by the household with
median income among those belonging to the government budget constraint. It is
given by:
Ue ((1 − tm)ym − w,em)









where the right-hand side is given by (12). To prove our claim, we show that (tm,em)
defeats any bundle with more or less educational expenditures. Consider a bundle
(t′,e′) representing a higher level of expenditures than (tm,em). All the households
at school with income lower than the median i.e., with y ∈ [yl,ym], prefer (tm,e)
to (t′,e′). This is a consequence of the assumption that the preferred bundle of
expenditure-tax increases with income. Similarly, the households out of school i.e.,
those with y ∈ [y,yl], also prefer (tm,em) to (t′,e′) in order to decrease taxes since
their utility is not aﬀected by the quality of public education. Since these two groups
represent half of the electorate, (tm,em) defeats (t′,e′). The same claim can be done
with respect to any (t′′,e′′) corresponding to a lower expenditure-tax bundle. Since
10the preferred bundle increases with income, all the households with income higher
than the median prefer (tm,em) to (t′′,e′′). Since they are 50% of the voters, (tm,em)
beats (t′′,e′′).
If all households were at school, the median income voter preferred bundle would
be the voting equilibrium. Indeed, the monotonicity conditions imposed on the
preferences ensure single-crossing of the utility function given by (3). The fact that
some households decide not to join the educational system does not alter the voting
equilibrium under the assumption that the preferred bundle is increasing in income.
This happens because the households not going to school and voting for small quality
would anyway be the ones preferring the lower expenditure-tax bundle under this
assumption. Therefore, the fact that they do not go to school does not aﬀect the
voting equilibrium.
We now turn to the case in which the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax de-
creases with income for those households attending public school. The median in-
come household’s preferred tax rate cannot be the majority voting equilibrium in
this setting. All the households with income higher than the median would be in
favor of a marginal decrease in the expenditure-tax bundle. Similarly, all the house-
holds out of school would support the same marginal decrease since they do not
beneﬁt from the educational system. If there is an equilibrium, it will be given by a
tax level decided by a coalition grouping the poorer and richer households. In this
ends against the middle equilibrium, educational expenditures will be lower than
the level chosen by the median voter.
This result is strictly related to the failure of the single-crossing condition of
the utility function (6). In this case, the preferred bundle is decreasing in income.
Thus, the poor households should be the ones supporting the highest expenditures
in education. However, since they are out of school, they support low educational
expenditures. Therefore, they join forces with the rich that also prefer low expendi-
tures under the assumption that the preferred bundle is decreasing in income. We
derive necessary conditions for an interior majority voting equilibrium in Proposition
2.
Proposition 2. If the preferred bundle is decreasing in income and there is a ma-
jority voting equilibrium, it corresponds to the bundle in the government budget
constraint most preferred by a household ˆ y. Between this pivotal voter, ˆ y, and the
household indiﬀerent between no school and public school, yl, there is exactly half of
the population.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. We ﬁrst suppose that at points on the gov-
ernment budget constraint where households yl and ˆ y exist, an equilibrium requires
11that half of the population is located between them. The second part shows that
the existence of households yl and ˆ y is essential for all candidate points to be an
equilibrium.
Households with income y ∈ [yl, ˆ y] strictly prefer to go to public school than
to be out of school, according to Corollary 1. If the preferred bundle is decreasing
in income, they would prefer a marginal increase in the expenditure-tax bundle to
(ˆ e,ˆ t). If these households constitute the majority of the population, such a marginal
increase defeats point (ˆ e,ˆ t).
Now consider households with income y > ˆ y. If the preferred bundle is decreasing
in income, they prefer a marginal decrease in the expenditure-tax bundle to (ˆ e,ˆ t).
Households with income y < yl would also prefer a decrease in the expenditure-tax
bundle since they are out of school. Thus, if they are majority, a marginal decrease
in the expenditure-tax bundle defeats bundle (ˆ e,ˆ t). Hence, given the existence of
households yl and ˆ y at a point on the government budget constraint, there must be
exactly half of the population between them for it to be an equilibrium.
The existence of household yl is ensured by the assumption that the lowest income
household is out of school at the median income preferred level of expenditure-tax. In
addition, if there is a household ˆ y it must have an income higher than yl, otherwise it
would not have public school as its preferred choice. The non-existence of household
ˆ y precludes the existence of an equilibrium.14
Therefore, we may expect that those systems in which school enrollment is not
widespread and the preferred level of expenditures is decreasing in income, the total
educational budget is lower than if all the children were at public schools. Clearly,
this does not imply that the amount spent by student is necessarily lower. Indeed,
the educational expenditures are divided over a smaller number of pupils when
enrollment is not total.
While the conditions stated in Proposition 2 are necessary, they are not suﬃcient
for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium. The main diﬃculty in establishing
a majority voting equilibrium in this setting is related to the absence of single-
crossing in (6). To see this, consider the case of a household currently out of school.
While he is opposed to a marginal increase in the quality of public education, he
may vote for a large increase of it provided that it allows him to enter school. On the
contrary, a middle income voter may favor a small increase of the quality but will
most probably be against large increases. The candidate point is an equilibrium if the
group that favors a large increase is smaller than the one against it. Ultimately, the
fact that a given level of education quality satisfying Proposition 2 is an equilibrium
14See Epple and Romano (1996), pages 314-316 for more details on this issue.
12depends on the preferences and on the income distribution. In Section 5, we simulate
the model in order to determine whether there is an equilibrium choice of e. In all the
exercises we have performed, the candidate point satisfying the necessary conditions
appear as a majority voting equilibrium.
We now brieﬂy discuss how our results change if one considers that public educa-
tion is ﬁnanced through other tax schemes. We start by considering the hypothetical
case in which the government could impose a lump sum tax on all households. In
this case, only the income eﬀect is present. Indeed, the tax paid by each individual is
unrelated to its income level. Thus, the preferred level of educational expenditures
is monotonically increasing and the result in Proposition 1 always apply under the
Assumption that education is a normal good. Another possibility is to consider that
the tax is levied on consumption rather than on income. This is especially relevant
in the context of developing countries where indirect taxes frequently constitute an
important part of the tax revenues. Moreover, this reinforces the fact that all the
households help ﬁnancing the educational system, since one may argue that income
taxes are normally not paid by very poor individuals. With commodity taxation,
the results would be very similar except that child labor would be also taxed in this
case.
In our model, the private sector is ruled out from the analysis. However, we can
speculate how the results would change if one allowed for the existence of private
schools in this model. While the private sector is generally small in developing
countries, this may apply to some countries that have more private schools. As in
Epple and Romano (1996) and in other papers mentioned above, the introduction of
private schools would reduce the political support for public education expenditures
by the rich households. Thus, one should expect a generalization of the ends against
the middle result. Indeed, under both monotonicity assumptions, the poor and rich
households would form a coalition and vote for low taxes.
Throughout we have assumed that all the individuals in this economy vote. In
reality, some households do not vote, even when voting is compulsory. Clearly, if
turnout is unrelated to the households’ characteristics, our results are unchanged.
However, if the decision to go voting is related to the household’s income or schooling
level, our results may change. The literature on developed countries shows a positive
relation between income/ education and the probability to go voting. Few empirical
studies investigate this issue in the context of developing countries. Fornos et al.
(2004) investigate voting turnout in several Latin American countries. Their results
suggest that voting turnout is not inﬂuenced by socioeconomic variables. In any
case, the introduction of voting abstention correlated with income/ education level
should be straightforward. Suppose that in an extreme case, all the households
13out of school do not go voting. In this case, the majority voting equilibrium would
correspond to the preferred level of the median voter among those households voting.
4 The introduction of a conditional cash transfer
In this Section, we analyze the impact of the introduction of a CCT program on the
equilibrium level of educational expenditures. We assume that the CCT program
grants a cash transfer equal to b if the household attends school. For the sake of
interest, we restrict our analysis to the case in which the cash transfer partially
compensates its recipients for the opportunity cost of education, i.e., b < w.
We assume that the CCT program is universal, so that all households attending
school are eligible to it. In reality, CCT programs are means-tested since there is
a maximum income threshold in order to be eligible to it. However, considering
an universal program greatly simpliﬁes the exposition without altering the main
results. In the presence of a CCT program, the budget constraint of a household
using public education is:
ci = (1 − t)yi − w + b, (19)
and its indirect utility function becomes:
V e(e,t,b) = U ((1 − t)yi − w + b,e). (20)
We assume that the CCT program is ﬁnanced by taxes. The government budget
constraint becomes:
tya = (e + b)θ (21)
A household i compares (5) to (20) in order to take its enrollment decision. Thus,
its utility function is given by:
Γ(e,t,b) = max{U ((1 − t)yi,0),U ((1 − t)yi − w + b,e)}. (22)
Using (22), let Ψ(e,t,b,w,yi) be the utility diﬀerential between joining or not the
school system when a CCT program is in place:
Ψ(e,t,b,w,yi) ≡ U ((1 − t)yi,0) − U((1 − t)yi − w + b,e). (23)
Clearly, a cash transfer that completely compensates for the opportunity cost of
education, b = w, induces full enrollment for any positive level of public education.
In such a case, Ψ(e,t,b,w,yi) < 0. Moreover, the poorer the household, the higher
the level of cash transfer needed to persuade him to join the school system. This
14is due to the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Consequently, if the
cash transfer only partially compensates the household for the opportunity cost of
education, the CCT program may not be able to achieve full enrollment. Indeed,
for very poor households, Φ(e,t,b,w,yi) > 0 for every value of b < w. This is
particularly true if the level of public education quality, e, is not high enough to
induce full enrollment, as we have assumed in Section 3.
We now turn to our main result concerning the eﬀect of a CCT on the total
amount of resources devoted to public education.
Proposition 3. If the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax is decreasing in income,
an increase in the conditional cash transfer raises the level of public education ex-
penditures obtained by majority voting.
Proof. Let yp denote the income level of the household indiﬀerent between no school
and public school in the presence of a CCT program. Using (23) it is deﬁned by







Uc ((1 − t)yp − w + b,e)
(1 − t)[Uc ((1 − t)yp,0) − Uc ((1 − t)yp − w + b,e)]
< 0. (24)
With an increase in the CCT, the voter indiﬀerent between going to school or not
moves to the left. Proposition 2 states that between this household and the pivotal
household, ˆ y, should be located half of the population in order to (ˆ e,ˆ t) to be an
equilibrium. Therefore, if the increase in b displaces yp to the left, the new ˆ y (if
it exists) also moves to the left, corresponding to a lower income level. Since the
preferred level of the expenditure-tax bundle is decreasing in income, its preferred
choice corresponds to a higher level of educational expenditures.
Proposition 3 shows that a CCT program may increase the support for large
expenditures in public education by allowing low income households to join the
educational system. This is true under the assumption that the preferred bundle
of expenditure-tax is decreasing in income. The new pivotal voter is located more
to the left and therefore it prefers a higher level of public educational expenditures
compared to the previous situation. However, even if the tax rate increases, the
amount of resources per student will not necessarily be higher. Indeed, part of
the budget is used to ﬁnance the conditional cash transfer. Moreover, an increased
cash transfer beneﬁt attracts new students to the educational system, potentially
decreasing the amount of resources per student. In Section 5, we simulate the model
for diﬀerent values of the cash transfer.
155 Simulation
In this Section we simulate the model in order to determine whether we have a
global majority voting equilibrium under the assumption that the preferred bundle
of expenditure-tax is decreasing in income. As shown in Appendix B, this case
corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between education and consumption
higher than the income elasticity of education. We ﬁrst investigate the existence of
a point satisfying the necessary conditions stated in Proposition 2. Then, we verify
whether this point is a global majority voting equilibrium by comparing it to several
other points in the government budget constraint.
In this simulation15, we deﬁne our parameters in order to ﬁt as close as possi-
ble the Brazilian data. For simplicity, we assume that the income distribution is
log-normally distributed, lny ∼ N(µ,σ2). The parameters of the income distribu-
tion are calculated in order to provide an annual mean and median income equal
to R$20,400 and R$10,800, which correspond to the values obtained in the 2006
Brazilian Household Survey. These amount to µ = 2.38 and σ = 1.27 if income is
measured in thousands. This corresponds to a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.534, very simi-
lar to the actual Gini coeﬃcient calculated by IBGE equal to 0.528 in 2006.16 We
simulate our model using the CES utility function:
U(c,e) = [βeρ + (1 − β)cρ]. (25)
As shown in Appendix B, the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax is decreasing
in income for a CES utility function whenever ρ > w−b
yi .17 We calibrate our utility
function in order to obtain roughly 85% of students enrolled at school. We arbitrarily
ﬁx the opportunity cost of education to R$650.18
A bundle (e,t) satisfying the necessary conditions given in Proposition 2 is the
solution to the following system of non-linear equations:
15We used Mathematica to perform the simulations presented in this paper. The code is available
upon request from the authors. We thank Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano for providing us
with their simulation code that was a great source of inspiration.
16The Gini coeﬃcient of a lognormal distribution is given by the ratio of standard deviation over
the mean. The actual Gini coeﬃcient is calculated by IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e
Estatistica, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, www.ibge.gov.br.
17In order to verify whether this condition holds, we have to check if ρ >
w−b
yl , since yl is the
household with the lowest income to enter school. In all the simulations we have performed, this
was always the case.
18Bourguignon et al. (2003) estimate the annual child labor earnings to be around R$960 and
R$1,560. However, they recognize that school attendance can be combined with some amount of
child work. Since we take into account only the part of the child labor earnings that is incompatible
with schooling, we have chosen a value for the opportunity cost of education that is much lower
than the observed child wages.
16F1 = [βeρ + (1 − β)((1 − t)yl − w + b)ρ] − [(1 − β)((1 − t)yl)ρ] = 0 (26)











f(y)dy − 0.5 = 0 (28)
F4 = ρβeρ−1 − ρ(1 − β)((1 − t)ˆ y − w + b)ρ−1 dt
de
ˆ y = 0 (29)
F5 = ρβeρ−1 + ρ(1 − β)
￿
























We present some results in Tables 2 and 3 for values of b ranging from 0 to 180.
These results conﬁrm the predictions obtained in the theoretical model. The higher
the cash transfer, the more low income pupils can join the educational system. The
increase in enrollment shifts the pivotal voter to the left of the income distribution.
Since the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax is decreasing in income, the poorer
the pivotal voter, the higher its preferred tax rate. In our results, this implies an
increase in the expenditures per student, meaning that the increase in the tax rate
is high enough to compensate for additional students. The key diﬀerence between
these two cases is the elasticity of substitution between education and consumption
equal to 1.66 and 1.43, respectively. A lower elasticity of substitution means that the
households consider education and consumption as more complements and therefore
the enrollment rate and the preferred level of education are higher.
ρ = 0.4, β = 0.1, µ = 2.38, σ = 1.13, w = 650, ya = 20.4





0 444.40 0.0136 62.62 7,513.79 39,276.40 -10.45 0.04
60 466.56 0.0177 68.65 6,243.89 29,501.80 -8.20 0.04
120 487.37 0.0222 74.58 5,122.09 23,455.30 -6.38 0.05
180 514.90 0.0274 80.53 4,090.98 19,179.10 -4.77 0.05
Table 2: Choice of e for a given level of b.
The conditions speciﬁed in equations (26) to (31) are necessary but not suﬃ-
cient for an equilibrium. A majority voting equilibrium requires that the candidate
point deﬁned by the system of equations receives more than half of the votes when
confronted to all the other possible points belonging to the government budget con-
17ρ = 0.3, β = 0.1, µ = 2.38, σ = 1.13, w = 650, ya = 20.4





0 1,005.47 0.0439 89.14 2,684.57 14,736.30 -0.86 0.05
60 1,005.90 0.0476 91.12 2,359.99 13,909.00 -0.75 0.05
120 1,008.65 0.051 92.99 2,044.58 13,177.20 -0.64 0.05
180 1,013.56 0.055 94.72 1,739.94 12,542.20 -0.53 0.05
Table 3: Choice of e for a given level of b.
straint. In order to verify this, let (e,t) be the expenditure-tax bundle preferred
by the pivotal voter, ˆ y and deﬁned by equations (26) to (31). Take (˜ e,˜ t) to be any
alternative expenditure-tax bundle. This point has to belong to the government
budget constraint, by satisfying the two equations:
K1 =
￿
β˜ eρ + (1 − β)((1 − ˜ t)˜ yl − w + b)ρ￿
−
￿
(1 − β)((1 − ˜ t)˜ yl)ρ￿
= 0 (32)








Let yk be the individual indiﬀerent between public school at (e,t) and (˜ e,˜ t). It is
deﬁned by:
[βeρ + (1 − β)((1 − t)yk − w + b)ρ] −
￿
β˜ eρ + (1 − β)((1 − ˜ t)yk − w + b)ρ￿
= 0 (34)
Suppose ﬁrst that (e,t) > (˜ e,˜ t). Since the preferred bundle of expenditure-tax is
decreasing in income, we know that yk > ˆ y. All the households with income higher
than yk prefer (˜ e,˜ t) to (e,t). The households with income lower than yk compare
public school at (e,t) with no school at (˜ e,˜ t), since in the latter case they pay lower
taxes. Deﬁne yj as the household indiﬀerent between being out of school at (˜ e,˜ t)
and public school at (e,t). It is given by:
[βeρ + (1 − β)((1 − t)yj − w + b)ρ] −
￿
(1 − β)((1 − ˜ t)yj − w + b)ρ￿
= 0 (35)
The political support for (e,t) against (˜ e,˜ t) come from the households with income
between yj and yk. Thus, in order for (e,t) to be a majority voting equilibrium
when compared to inferior levels of expenditure-tax, at least half of the population
has to have income between yj and yk. Now consider that (e,t) < (˜ e,˜ t). In this
case, yk < ˆ y. Household j is now deﬁned as:
18￿
β˜ eρ + (1 − β)((1 − ˜ t)yj − w + b)ρ￿
− [(1 − β)((1 − t)yj)ρ] = 0 (36)
Now, the voters supporting (e,t) against (˜ e,˜ t) are those with income higher than yk
or smaller than yj. Thus, they have to constitute more than half of the voters when
(e,t) is compared to all alternatives representing a higher expenditure-tax bundle.
In all the simulations we have done, (e,t) appeared to be a global majority voting
equilibrium. It has always been preferred to alternative bundles by a majority of
voters in a pairwise comparison. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the typical results we
have obtained. They correspond to the cases presented in Tables 2 and 3 when the
cash transfer is equal to 180.







Figure 1: Voting for (e,t) against (˜ e,˜ t) when ρ = 0.4 and b = 180.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we assume that the level of public education expenditures is related
to the household’s preferences. We show that the fact that some households are out
of school may cause a reduction in the quality of public education. If preferences
for public education are decreasing in income, poor and rich households may form a
coalition and vote for low expenditures. In this setting, the introduction of a CCT
program may actually improve the quality of public education. Indeed, by providing
the access of low income households to the educational system, the CCT program
may inﬂuence the voting equilibrium in favor of increased educational expenditures.
This mechanism seems to be much ignored in many of the discussions related






Figure 2: Voting for (e,t) against (˜ e,˜ t) when ρ = 0.3 and b = 180.
to education policy. It is often argued that increasing the quality of education
should be a prerequisite for the increase in enrollment. Similarly, much of critics
against the conditional cash transfer programs argue that the quality of education
is too low to justify sending children to school. This model shows that it may be
hard to obtain an increase in the quality of education if the households are not at
school. The incentives for policymakers to concentrate resources in education are
very low if a large proportion of the population is out of school. Therefore, to start
by increasing school enrollment may be a good strategy since it may change the
priorities of policymakers and lead to an improvement in the quality of education.
20References
Baland, J. M. and Robinson, J. A. (2000). Is child labor ineﬃcient. Journal of
Political Economy, 108(4):663–679.
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F. H. G., and Leite, P. G. (2003). Conditional cash trans-
fers, schooling, and child labor: Micro-simulating brazil’s bolsa escola program.
The World Bank Economic Review, 17(2):229–254.
Cardoso, E. and Souza, A. P. (2004). The impact of cash transfers on child labor
and school attendance in brazil. Working Paper Vanderbilt University, 04-W07.
Chen, Z. and West, E. G. (2000). Selective versus universal vouchers: Modeling me-
dian voter preferences in education. The American Economic Review, 90(5):1520–
1534.
Cohen-Zada, D. and Justman, M. (2003). The political economy of school choice:
linking theory and evidence. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(2):277–308.
Das, J., Do, Q.-T., and Ozler, B. (2005). Reassessing conditional cash transfer
programs. The World Bank Research Observer, 20(1):57–80.
de Janvry, A., Finan, F., Sadoulet, E., and Vakis, R. (2006). Can conditional
cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from
working when exposed to shocks? Journal of Development Economics, 79(2):349–
373.
de la Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2009). To segregate or to integrate: education
politics and democracy. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(2):597–628.
Dubois, P., de Janvry, A., and Sadoulet, E. (2003). Eﬀects on school enrollment
and performance of a conditional transfers program in mexico. Department of
Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, 981.
Epple, D. and Romano, R. E. (1994). Ends against the middle: Determining public
service provision when there are private alternatives. Working paper, University
of Florida.
Epple, D. and Romano, R. E. (1996). Ends against the middle: Determining public
service provision when there are private alternatives. Journal of Public Economics,
62(3):297–325.
Fernandez, R. and Rogerson, R. (1995). On the political economy of education
subsidies. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(2):249–262.
21Fornos, C. A., Power, T. J., and Garand, J. C. (2004). Explaining voter turnout in
latin america, 1980 to 2000. Comparative Political Studies, 37(8):909–940.
Gans, J. S. and Smart, M. (1996). Majority voting with single-crossing preferences.
Journal of Public Economics, 59(2):219–237.
Gertler, P. (2004). Do conditional cash transfers improve child health? evidence
from progresa’s control randomized experiment. AEA Papers and Proceedings,
94(2):336–341.
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B. (1998). Opting out of publicly provided services: A
majority voting result. Social Choice and Welfare, 15(2):187–199.
Hanushek, E. A. (2005). The economics of school quality. German of Economic
Review, 6(3):269–286.
Hoyt, W. H. and Lee, K. (1998). Educational vouchers, welfare eﬀects, and voting.
Journal of Public Economics, 69(2):211–228.
Kenny, L. W. (1978). The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic
society: a generalization. Public choice, 33(2):117–120.
Milgrom, P. and Shannon, C. (1994). Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica,
62(1):157–180.
Ranjan, P. (1999). An economic analysis of child labor. Economics Letters, 64(1):99–
105.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1974). The demand for education in public and private school systems.
Journal of Public Economics, 3(4):349–385.
Tanaka, R. (2003). Inequality as a determinant of child labor. Economics Letters,
80(1):93–97.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424.
UNESCO (2008). Education for all by 2015, will we make it? EFA Global Monitoring
Report.
22A Proof of Diminishing Marginal Utility
Proof. This proof follows Epple and Romano (1994). Along an indiﬀerence curve,
we know that:
Ucdc + Uede = 0. (37)
The marginal utility of private consumption is given by Uc(c,e). Diﬀerentiating this










Assume that pe units of private consumption can be transformed into one unit of
consumption. The maximization problem of the household is:
maxU(c,e) s.t. c = y − pe. (39)
At any point (c,e) satisfying U(c,e) = U, the equilibrium condition implies that:
−pUc(y − pe,e) + Ue(y − pe,e) = 0. (40)
Totally diﬀerentiating (40) with respect to e and y, we can compute the response of





Uee − 2pUec + p2Ucc
. (41)
The denominator is negative due to the assumption of strict quasiconcavity of the
utility function. This becomes more explicit once we replace p using (40). The
assumption that e is a normal good implies that de
dy > 0. Hence, the numerator is
negative, or, using (40):
pUcc − Uec =
Ue
Uc
Ucc − Uec < 0. (42)















what yields the result.
B Elasticity
In this Section, we show that the desired level of public education expenditures
increases (resp. decreases) with income whenever the income elasticity of education
23is larger (resp. smaller) than the elasticity of substitution between e and c. The
proof follows closely Kenny (1978) We then illustrate the results in our case for a
CES utility function.
Consider an individual with a utility function U deﬁned over consumption of a
numeraire, c, and education of quality e. For simplicity, assume there is no condi-
tional cash transfer program, that is, b = 0. Normalizing the price of c to 1 and
using qi to denote the price of e paid by household i, its budget constraint is:
ci = yi − w − qie.
Since education is publicly provided and ﬁnanced through proportional taxation,
the price paid by each consumer depends on its income. The equilibrium of the















Let e(q,y) be the demand function for educational services, where we eliminate the











Multiplying the equation by
y












where ηey = ∂e
∂y
y
e is the income elasticity of education and εeq = ∂e
∂q
q
e is the price
elasticity of the uncompensated demand for education. The last term in the right-
















= ηey + εeq (45)










< 0 ⇔ ηey < εeq (47)
Similarly, the above conditions can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of substi-













or, by multiplying through by
q
e and the last term by
y
y to obtain it in elasticity
terms:









is the price elasticity of the compensated demand for educa-
tion and α = c
y is the proportion of income spent on private consumption. In order
to compute ξeq, consider a price change that is compensated by an income change
that leaves the utility level unchanged. We get:
dU = Ucdc + Uede = 0.
Since Uc
Ue = 1
q, we can write:
dc + qde = 0.





















αξcq + (1 − α)ξeq = 0 (50)





|U=¯ U = ξcq − ξeq (51)
Combining (50) and (51), we obtain:
25ξeq = −ασ (52)
















< 0 ⇔ ηey < σ (55)
B.1 Example: CES Utility Function
Consider the following utility function:
U(ci,e) = βeρ + (1 − β)c
ρ
i, (56)
where ci = (1 − t)yi − w + b.





The income elasticity of the demand for education is:
ηey =
yi














< 0 ⇔ ρ >
w − b
yi
(60)
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